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Human reasoning is accompanied by metacognitive experiences, most notably the ease or diffi- 
culty of recall and thought generation and the fluency with which new information can be pro- 
cessed. These experiences are informative in their own right. They can serve as a basis of judg- 
ment in addition to, or at the expense of, declarative information and can qualify the 
conclusions drawn from recalled content. What exactly people conclude from a given 
metacognitive experience depends on the naive theory of mental processes they bring to bear, 
rendering the outcomes highly variable. The obtained judgments cannot be predicted on the ba- 
sis of accessible declarative information alone; we cannot understand human judgment without 
taking into account the interplay of declarative and experiential information. 
Most theories of human judgment assume that we form judg- 
ments on the basis of declarative information that is applica- 
ble to the target and happens to come to mind at the time of 
judgment (for reviews see Higgins, 1996; Wyer & Srull, 
1989). Accordingly, we should evaluate a product more fa- 
vorably the more positive attributes come to mind. Similarly, 
we should evaluate the validity of a product claim by drawing 
on relevant accessible knowledge about the respective con- 
tent domain. These widely shared assumptions miss, how- 
ever, that there is more to thinking than thought content. Our 
thought processes are accompanied by metacognitive experi- 
ences, such as the ease or difficulty with which some infor- 
mation can be brought to mind or the fluency with which new 
information can be processed. These experiences are infor- 
mative in their own right and people draw on them in forming 
judgments and making decisions. As a result, their judg- 
ments and decisions often deviate from what one would pre- 
dict on the basis of accessible declarative information. For 
example, consumers have been found to like a product less, 
the more positive attributes they brought to mind (e.g., 
Menon & Raghubir, 2003; Wanke, Bohner, & Jurowitsch, 
1997) and to be more likely to defer choice the more reasons 
Requests for reprints should be sent to Norbert Schwarz, Institute for So- 
cial Research, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, MI 48104-1248. 
E-mail: Nschwarz@umich.edu 
they generated for making a choice (e.g., Novemsky, Dhar, 
Simonson, & Schwarz, 2003). Other research found that peo- 
ple are more likely to endorse a statement as true when the 
color in which it is printed makes it easy rather than difficult 
to read (e.g., Reber & Schwarz, 1999) or when the words 
rhyme (e.g., McGlone & Tofighbakhsh, 2000). 
Findings of this type are difficult to reconcile with con- 
tent-focused models of judgment. Instead, they show that the 
subjective experiences that accompany the thought process 
qualify the implications of accessible declarative informa- 
tion, often to the extent that the judgment is opposite to what 
the accessible content seems to imply. What exactly people 
conclude from their metacognitive experiences depends on 
their naive theories of memory and cognition, that is, their as- 
sumptions about what makes it easy or difficult to think of 
certain things or to process new information. Moreover, peo- 
ple do not draw on their subjective experiences when their in- 
formational value is called into question, for example, when 
they have reason to assume that recall is only difficult be- 
cause they are currently distracted by an unrelated event. 
This interplay between (a) accessible declarative informa- 
tion, (b) accompanying metacognitive experiences, (c) the 
perceived informational value of these experiences, and (d) 
the naive theories used to interpret them, gives rise to many 
complexities that cannot be accounted for on the basis of 
content-focused models of judgment. 
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This article provides a selective review of what has been 
learned and offers a number of conjectures that await testing. 
The conceptualization offered here differs from my own ear- 
lier theorizing (e.g., Schwarz, 1998; Schwarz & Clore, 1996) 
by emphasizing the role of naive theories as a necessary link 
between people's experiences and the inferences they draw 
from them. The first section addresses the role of accessibil- 
ity experiences, that is, the ease or difficulty with which the 
respective content can be brought to mind, in judgment and 
decision making. The second section addresses the influence 
of processing fluency, that is, the ease or difficulty with 
which new information can be processed. A final section 
highlights parallels between the use of these metacognitive 
experiences in judgment and the use of other sources of expe- 
riential information (namely moods, emotions, and bodily 
sensations) and addresses related conceptual issues. 
ACCESSIBLE CONTENT AND 
ACCESSIBILITY EXPERIENCES: 
BEYOND WHAT COMES TO MIND 
Suppose you are asked to list half a dozen outstanding new 
restaurants in Chicago. The first two or three easily come to 
mind; after that, the task becomes effortful and you have to 
search memory for additional candidates. But you eventually 
manage to complete your list of six excellent new restau- 
rants. What do you conclude from the difficulty you experi- 
enced in coming up with six examples? That Chicago doesn't 
have many new outstanding new restaurants? That your 
memory for restaurants is poor and you can hardly recall 
them, even if you liked them? That new restaurants aren't 
very important to you and you hardly pay attention to them? 
That you really have other things on your mind and find it 
hard to concentrate on restaurants at the moment? Or that you 
don't know much about Chicago to begin with? 
Each one of these conclusions is potentially plausible and 
entails a different metamemory theory that explains the expe- 
rienced difficulty of recall. Some of these naive theories bear 
on the world out there, for example, that examples are easy to 
recall when there are many, and hence your difficulty proba- 
bly reflects a lack of good new restaurants. Other naive theo- 
ries pertain to the working of your own mind, for example, 
that it is hard to recall things one doesn't pay attention to. Yet 
others pertain to temporary situational influences, for exam- 
ple, that it is hard to recall things when one is preoccupied 
with something else. Which of these, or many other, naive 
theories of memory you draw on, will determine what you 
conclude from your recall experience. All of these conclu- 
sions, however, imply that the subjective experience is infor- 
mative in its own right and provides information that goes be- 
yond the implications of the recalled examples per se. 
Moreover, the application of any one of these theories en- 
tails an explanation of the accessibility experience that ren- 
ders the experience uninformative for judgments that require 
a different theory as an inference rule. Once you concluded, 
for example, that there aren't many outstanding new restau- 
rants, it no longer follows that you simply have poor memory 
for restaurants; conversely, after you concluded that you have 
poor memory for restaurants, it no longer follows with any 
certainty that there aren't many new ones. And if you attrib- 
ute your difficulty to being distracted by something else, or to 
being thoroughly unfamiliar with Chicago in the first place, 
your accessibility experience is uninformative for any of the 
other judgments. 
This theory-driven nature of inferences from accessibility 
experiences implies that the same experience may give rise to 
many different conclusions, including conclusions that are 
mutually exclusive. Different judgment tasks recruit differ- 
ent applicable theories, although other contextual variables 
may also influence the accessibility of relevant theories and 
their application. Next, I illustrate the profound impact of ac- 
cessibility experiences and subsequently review some of the 
naive theories of memory that determine their operation. 
An Example 
If judgments were solely based on what comes to mind, we 
should observe, for example, that a task that renders many of 
an individual's own assertive behaviors accessible in mem- 
ory results in judgments of higher assertiveness than a task 
that renders only a few assertive behaviors accessible. Em- 
pirically, this is not the case. In an initial series of studies, we 
asked participants to recall either 6 or 12 examples of their 
own assertive or unassertive behavior (Schwarz et al., 1991). 
Subsequently, participants rated their own assertiveness. As 
shown in Figure 1, participants rated themselves as more as- 
sertive after recalling six examples of assertive behavior than 
after recalling six examples of unassertive behavior. Yet in- 
creasing the number of recalled examples not only failed to 
increase the difference but reversed the observed pattern: 
Participants who successfully recalled 12 examples of asser- 
4 1 
6 examples 12 examples 
FIGURE 1 Self-reports of assertiveness as a function of valence 
and number of recalled behaviors. Note: N is 9 or 10 per condition. 
Mean score of three questions is given; possible range is 1 to 10, with 
higher values reflecting higher assertiveness (see Experiment 1, 
Schwarz, Bless, Strack, eta]., 1991) 
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tive behavior rated themselves as less assertive than partici- 
pants who recalled 12 examples of unassertive behavior. 
Moreover, those who recalled 12 assertive (unassertive, re- 
spectively) behaviors rated themselves as less (more, respec- 
tively) assertive than those who recalled only 6 examples. 
Perhaps this reversal merely indicates that the quality of 
the examples deteriorated the more participants had to recall, 
leaving participants in the 12-examples condition with a 
poorer set of accessible examples? Content analyses indi- 
cated that this was not the case. Instead, the observed reversal 
reflected participants' experience that it was easy to recall 6 
examples, but difficult to recall 12. This difficulty, in turn, 
presumably suggested to participants that they can't be so 
(un)assertive after all, or else it wouldn't be so difficult to 
come up with 12 examples. Supporting this interpretation, 
the impact of participants' subjective accessibility experi- 
ence was eliminated when they were led to attribute the expe- 
rience to the influence of background music played to them 
(Schwarz et al., 1991, Experiment 3), reversing the otherwise 
obtained pattern. In this case, they drew on the recalled con- 
tent and reported higher (lower, respectively) assertiveness 
the more examples of assertive (unassertive, respectively) be- 
haviors they had recalled. 
Other studies provided converging evidence by isolating 
the role of accessibility experiences in different ways. For ex- 
ample, Stepper and Strack (1993, Experiment 2; see also 
Sanna, Schwarz, & Small, 2002) asked all participants to re- 
call six examples of assertive or unassertive behavior, thus 
holding actual recall demands constant. To manipulate the 
experienced ease of recall, they induced participants to con- 
tract either their corrugator muscle or their zygomaticus 
muscle during the recall task. Contraction of the corrugator 
muscle produces a furrowed brow, an expression commonly 
associated with a feeling of effort. Contraction of the 
zygomaticus muscle produces a light smile, an expression 
commonly associated with a feeling of ease. As expected, 
participants who recalled six examples of assertive behavior 
while adopting a light smile judged themselves as more as- 
sertive than participants who adopted a furrowed brow. Con- 
versely, participants who recalled six examples of unasser- 
tive behavior while adopting a light smile judged themselves 
as less assertive than participants who adopted a furrowed 
brow. Finally, Wanke, Bless, and Biller (1996) controlled for 
accessible content by asking some participants to generate a 
few or many examples and subsequently presented these ex- 
amples to other, yoked participants. As expected, partici- 
pants who actively generated examples drew on their accessi- 
bility experiences and were more influenced when the task 
requested few rather than many examples. In contrast, yoked 
participants, who merely read the examples generated by 
others, were more influenced the more examples they read. 
In combination, these studies demonstrate that subjective 
accessibility experiences are informative in their own right 
and qualify the implications of recalled content. Moreover, 
people do not draw on their accessibility experiences when 
their informational value is called into question, paralleling 
earlier observations about the informational functions of 
moods (e.g., Schwarz & Clore, 1983; for a review, see 
Schwarz & Clore, 1996). Subsequent research highlighted, 
however, that the specific conclusions drawn from experi- 
enced ease or difficulty of recall or thought generation de- 
pend on the naive theory that people bring to bear on them, as 
illustrated by the restaurant example. 
NAIVE THEORIES 
Some naive theories of memory link one's recall experi- 
ences to the external world, whereas other theories trace 
them mostly to one's own state of knowledge or to situa- 
tional influences. An analysis in terms of the underlying na- 
ive theories is conceptually useful, although different theo- 
ries may occasionally lead to the same conclusions, as 
becomes apparent. 
The World Out There 
One naive theory that links one's recall experience to char- 
acteristics of the external world holds that the more exem- 
plars exist, the easier it is to bring some to mind. This gen- 
erally correct belief is at the heart of Tversky and 
Kahneman's (1973) availability heuristic and people infer 
higher frequency and probability when examples are easy 
rather than difficult to bring to mind. Because frequent ex- 
emplars are also more typical for their category, ease of re- 
call further suggests that the examples that come to mind 
are relatively typical. 
Most of the currently available studies can be interpreted 
in terms of this metamemory belief, which was the focus of 
our initial studies (Schwarz et al., 1991). Our results (see Fig- 
ure 1) presumably reflected that participants drew on the ease 
or difficulty of recall to determine the frequency and typical- 
ity of the respective behaviors in making trait judgments. A 
host of other studies reliably replicated the less-is-more ef- 
fect observed in our initial studies: Dutch students reported 
using their bicycle more often after recalling three rather than 
eight instances of bicycle use (Aarts & Dijksterhuis, 1999; 
see also Wanke, Schwarz, & Bless, 1995); British students 
liked Tony Blair more after listing only a few rather than 
many favorable thoughts about him (Haddock, 2002); Ger- 
man investors liked mutual funds more after listing only a 
few rather than many advantages they offer (Florack & 
Zoabi, 2003); American men inferred that they are at higher 
risk of heart disease after recalling few rather than many 
risk-increasing behaviors (Rothman & Schwarz, 1998; see 
also Raghubir & Menon, 1998); and students who had to gen- 
erate only a few arguments in favor of an attitude position 
held this position with greater confidence than those who had 
to generate many arguments (Haddock, Rothman, Reber, & 
Schwarz, 1999; Haddock, Rothman, & Schwarz, 1996). 
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Throughout, experienced ease of recall or thought generation 
resulted in judgments that were consistent with recalled con- 
tent, whereas difficulty of recall or thought generation re- 
sulted in judgments opposite to the implications of recalled 
content. 
Moreover, application of this metamemory theory (The 
more exemplars exist, the easier it is to bring some to mind) 
can thwart the success of otherwise plausible strategies de- 
signed to debias judgment, as the case of hindsight bias may 
illustrate. After the outcome of an event is known, people as- 
sume that they knew it all along and could have predicted the 
outcome in advance (Fischhoff, 1975; see Hawkins & Hastie, 
1990, for a review). To guard against this bias, people are of- 
ten encouraged to search for reasons why the event might 
have turned out otherwise, thus counteracting the influence 
of outcome knowledge (e.g., Fischhoff, 1982a, 1982b). Yet 
the more they try to do so, the harder it is to generate such 
reasons-leaving them all the more convinced that there 
weren't many ways in which the event could have turned out 
otherwise. Hence, they conclude that the outcome was, in- 
deed, inevitable, thus increasing rather than attenuating the 
size of the hindsight bias (Sanna & Schwarz, 2003; Sanna, 
Schwarz, & Stocker, 2002). Moreover, furrowing one's brow 
while thinking about counterfactual outcomes is enough to 
increase hindsight bias, whereas thinking about many rea- 
sons why the event just "had to happen" reduces hindsight, in 
contrast to what recommended debiasing strategies would 
suggest (Sanna, Schwarz, & Small, 2002). As these examples 
indicate, successful debiasing strategies need to take the in- 
terplay of accessible content and accessibility experience~ 
into account, as Sanna and Schwarz (2004) illustrated for a 
broad range of temporal biases. 
Other naive theories about one's memory and the world 
out there have received less attention. One relevant belief 
holds that details of recent events are easier to recall than de- 
tails of distant events. Accordingly, we may expect that ac- 
cessibility experiences affect event dating. Supporting this 
assumption, Xu and Schwarz (2004) observed that partici- 
pants who had to recall 10 details of the Oklahoma City 
bombing inferred that it was more distant in time than those 
who had to recall 2 details. 
My Mind 
Another set of naive theories about accessibility experiences 
pertains to the working of one's own mind. One of them cor- 
rectly holds that examples from categories that are well rep- 
resented in memory are easier to recall than examples from 
categories that are poorly represented in memory. Accord- 
ingly, individuals use the ease or difficulty of recall to infer 
how much information about a category is stored in memory. 
For example, Winkielman, Schwarz, and Belli (1998) ob- 
served that participants who had to recall 12 childhood 
events subsequently rated their childhood memory as poorer 
than participants who had to recall only 4 events, despite the 
fact that the former had just recalled three times as many 
events. This effect was eliminated when the researchers ac- 
knowledged that most people would find the task difficult, 
thus allowing participants to attribute their difficulty experi- 
ence to the nature of the task rather than their poor memory. 
Other beliefs about the mind have received less attention, 
although initial results are promising. For example, people 
correctly believe that the more they know about something 
the easier it is to come up with examples and that things that 
are important to them are better represented in memory than 
things that are unimportant. Accordingly, accessibility expe- 
riences are likely to feed into judgments of interest, expertise, 
and personal relevance. Schwarz and Schuman (1997; see 
also Bishop, 1987; Lasorsa, 2003), for example, observed 
that survey respondents reported less political interest, and 
less attention to public affairs, after they had a difficult time 
answering political knowledge questions-unless they were 
induced to attribute their difficulty to poor media coverage. 
Conversely, attributing difficulty of recall to one's lack of 
knowledge renders the accessibility experience uninforma- 
tive for judgments about the world out there (e.g., Biller, 
Bless, & Schwarz, 1992; Sanna & Schwarz, 2003). When 
asked to recall the names of 12 Spanish matadors, for exam- 
ple, you would hardly infer from recall difficulty that there 
aren't many matadors-after all, you're aware that you know 
little about bullfights. Accordingly, any experienced diffi- 
culty of recall is only informative when people assume some 
expertise to begin with. Consistent with this assumption, 
Tybout, Sternthal, Malaviya, Bakamitsos, and Park (in press) 
observed that accessibility experiences influenced consumer 
judgments when the brand was familiar, but not when it was 
unfamiliar. 
As a specific theory relevant to persuasion, Wanke and 
Bless (2000) suggested that recipients of a persuasive mes- 
sage may assume that plausible and compelling arguments 
are easier to remember than specious ones. Consistent with 
this conjecture, they observed that the same argument was 
more influential the more contextual cues facilitated its re- 
call, thus inducing an experience of ease. As may be expected 
on the basis of the observation that recipients only draw on 
argument quality under conditions of high processing moti- 
vation (Petty & Cacioppo, 1986), this theory pertaining to ar- 
gument quality was only applied under high motivation con- 
ditions, but not under low motivation conditions. This 
presumably reflects that the relevant theory only came to 
mind when recipients considered argument quality to begin 
with. 
Multiple Theories 
Some findings are ambiguous with regard to the underlying 
memory beliefs and can plausibly be traced to several differ- 
ent naive theories, which may contribute to the robustness of 
the observed phenomena. For example, Novemsky, Dhar, 
Simonson, and Schwarz (2003) explored the impact of acces- 
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sibility experiences on product choice. In one of their experi- 
ments, participants read two product descriptions and were 
asked to rate how easy it would be to generate either 2 or 10 
reasons for choosing one of them, expecting that they may 
later have to provide their reasons. Subsequently, participants 
had the opportunity to indicate their choice or to defer the de- 
cision to a later date. In the 2-reason condition, 49% opted for 
deferral, whereas 61 % did so in the 10-reason condition. In a 
related experiment, the same manipulation doubled the size 
of a compromise effect in choice (Simonson, 1989) from 
22% in the 2-reason condition to 44% in the 10-reason condi- 
tion (Novemsky et al., 2003). Quite clearly, accessibility ex- 
periences affect choice behavior in important ways. The ac- 
cessibility experiences produced in these experiments, 
however, may have affected participants' perception of how 
many advantages a given choice alternative has or how 
knowledgeable and competent they are in the respective do- 
main. Either of these experience-based inferences may result 
in choice deferral or a compromise choice. Although such 
multiple pathways to the same outcome make for a robust 
phenomenon, it is worth noting that they may have differen- 
tial implications for subsequent behavior. I would expect, for 
example, that deferrals based on a perceived lack of expertise 
generalize to other decisions in the same domain, whereas 
deferrals based on a perceived lack of good reasons to pick 
one of the specific alternatives do not. 
Another phenomenon that can be traced to multiple naive 
theories is the influence of accessibility experiences on con- 
fidence. Tormala, Petty, and Briiiol(2002; see also Haddock 
et al., 1996, 1999; Nelson & Narens, 1990) observed that 
ease of recall increases, and difticulty of recall decreases, 
one's confidence in the recalled content. Such differential 
confidence judgments may be derived from many of the na- 
ive theories discussed earlier: Higher confidence in the re- 
called content can follow from the belief that ease of recall 
indicates that there are many examples, that the recalled ones 
are highly typical, that I'm very knowledgeable about the do- 
main, that I paid considerable attention to the domain, have 
good memory for events in the domain, and so on. The rela- 
tion between these beliefs and confidence is asymmetrical, 
however, and high confidence per se does not allow the deri- 
vation of the other beliefs. I therefore consider confidence a 
derivative of the naive theories discussed earlier, although in- 
ferences of confidence may profoundly influence how we 
use recalled information. 
Determinants and Consequences of 
Theory Selection 
Given that different naive theories are applicable to the same 
accessibility experience, it is important to understand the de- 
terminants of their use. Earlier, I suggested that one key de- 
terminant is the judgment task itself, which presumably re- 
cruits a relevant theory that can serve as an applicable 
inference rule. I'd therefore expect, for example, that a per- 
son who finds it difficult to recall many examples of an event 
class infers (a) that there aren't many when asked about fre- 
quency (e.g., Aarts & Dijksterhuis, 1999); (b) that the rele- 
vant events happened a long time ago when asked about 
event dating (e.g., Schwarz, 2003); (c) that his or her memory 
for this information is poor when asked about memory qual- 
ity (e.g., Winkielman et al., 1998); (d) that he or she isn't fol- 
lowing events in this domain very closely when asked about 
interest (e.g., Schwarz & Schuman, 1997); or (e) to overesti- 
mate the level of background noise when asked about distrac- 
tion, and so on. Although support for several of these predic- 
tions is available from different studies, they still await 
testing in one unified experiment. 
Importantly, application of one theory typically renders 
most other theories inapplicable. Suppose, for example, that 
the first task (e.g., a frequency judgment) recruits a theory 
that entails an explanation of the experienced difficulty in 
terms of characteristics of the external world (e.g., there 
aren't many). Once this explanation is instantiated, the expe- 
rience no longer bears on judgments that require a different 
theory as an inference rule, like judgments of memory qual- 
ity or interest in the domain. After all, if this is a rare event to 
begin with, the fact that I can't recall many examples doesn't 
imply that I have poor memory-there simply aren't many 
examples. Accordingly, strong order effects should emerge 
in a series of judgments that require the application of differ- 
ent inference rules. At present, the relevant evidence is lim- 
ited to studies that induced participants to explain their acces- 
sibility experiences in terms of situational influences (e.g., 
Haddock et al., 1999; Schwarz et al., 1991) or their own ex- 
pertise in the respective domain (e.g., Sanna & Schwarz, 
2003), prior to assessing other judgments. As expected, these 
manipulations render the accessibility experience non- 
diagnostic for subsequent judgments. Under these condi- 
tions, participants turn to recalled content to arrive at a judg- 
ment, reversing the otherwise observed patterns. 
Finally, people's naive theories are highly malleable, to 
the extent that theories with opposite implications can be 
successfully induced. For example, Winkielman and 
Schwarz (2001) asked participants to recall either 4 or 12 
childhood events, without further instructions with regard 
to the happy or sad quality of these events. Following this 
recall task, we suggested to some participants that unpleas- 
ant events might be poorly represented in memory because 
we avoid thinking about the "bad stuff," making it difficult 
to recall details of unpleasant periods of one's life. In con- 
trast, we suggested to other participants that pleasant events 
might be poorly represented because we don't ruminate 
about the "good stuff," making it difficult to recall details of 
pleasant periods of one's life. As predicted, participants 
who had to recall 12 events, a difficult task, evaluated their 
childhood as less happy when the accessible metamemory 
belief entailed that negative life-periods are difficult to re- 
member than when it entailed that positive life-periods are 
difficult to remember. 
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PROCESSING MOTIVATION 
Complicating things further, individuals' reliance on accessi- 
ble content versus accessibility experiences depends on the 
processing motivation they bring to the task. In most cases, 
judges are likely to rely on their accessibility experiences as a 
source of information when processing motivation is low, but 
turn to accessible content when processing motivation is 
high, even when this content was difficult to recall. This ob- 
servation is consistent with the assumption that reliance on 
accessibility experiences is a heuristic processing strategy, 
whereas reliance on accessible content is a systematic pro- 
cessing strategy (Schwarz, 1998). 
For example, Rothman and Schwarz (1998; for a concep- 
tual replication, see Grayson & Schwarz, 1999) asked male 
participants to recall either a few or many behaviors that in- 
crease or decrease their risk for heart disease. To manipulate 
processing motivation, participants were first asked to report 
on their family history of heart disease. Presumably, this re- 
call task has higher personal relevance for those with a family 
history of heart disease than for those without, once this his- 
tory is rendered salient. As expected, men with a family his- 
tory of heart disease drew on the relevant behavioral informa- 
tion they recalled. They reported higher vulnerability after 
recalling eight rather than three risk-increasing behaviors, 
and lower vulnerability after recalling eight rather than three 
risk-decreasing behaviors. In contrast, men without a family 
history of heart disease drew on their accessibility experi- 
ences, resulting in the opposite pattern. They reported lower 
vulnerability after recalling eight rather than three risk-in- 
creasing behaviors, and higher vulnerability after recalling 
eight rather than three risk-decreasing behaviors. These find- 
ings (and their conceptual replication by Grayson & 
Schwarz, 1999) suggest that individuals are likely to draw on 
their subjective accessibility experiences under low process- 
ing motivation, but on accessible content under high process- 
ing motivation. 
Research into the interplay of mood and accessibility ex- 
periences provides further support for this conclusion. Ear- 
lier work showed that being in a happy mood fosters heuristic 
processing strategies, whereas being in a sad mood fosters 
systematic processing strategies (for reviews, see Schwarz, 
2002; Schwarz & Clore, 1996). Drawing on this work, Ruder 
and Bless (2003) expected that people in an induced happy 
mood would rely on their accessibility experiences, whereas 
people in an induced sad mood would rely on recalled con- 
tent. Four studies consistently supported these predictions. 
Finally, Florack and Zoabi (2003) observed higher reliance 
on accessibility experiences among participants low in need 
for cognition. In combination, these findings suggest that 
variables that commonly foster heuristic processing will also 
foster reliance on accessibility experiences. 
Although this generalization is likely to hold for many re- 
call and thought generation tasks, Wanke and Bless (2000) 
reported an interesting exception. As already noted, they as- 
sumed that individuals may hold the belief that it is easier to 
remember plausible and compelling arguments rather than 
specious ones. If so, they may consider a given argument 
more compelling when they find it easier to recall. To manip- 
ulate participants' accessibility experience, Wanke and Bless 
provided participants with retrieval cues that made it either 
easy or difficult to recall a given argument from a previously 
presented message. As expected, participants were more per- 
suaded by the same argument when this manipulation facili- 
tated its recall. Consistent with the general observation that 
argument quality is more likely to influence attitude judg- 
ments under high processing motivation (for reviews, see 
Eagly & Chaiken, 1993; Petty & Cacioppo, 1986), this effect 
was more pronounced under high than low motivation condi- 
tions. 
This finding suggests that motivation may influence the 
recruitment of relevant naive theories. Under high motiva- 
tion, recipients of a persuasive message focus on message 
content, which renders message related beliefs (e.g., plausi- 
ble arguments are easier to remember) relevant to the task. 
When relying on the number of arguments as a heuristic cue, 
on the other hand, participants may recruit the belief that 
when there are many arguments, it is easy to recall some, ren- 
dering accessibility experiences more influential under the 
low motivation conditions that facilitate reliance on periph- 
eral cues. These conjectures, and the role of motivation in the 
recruitment of naive theories, await further research. 
Summary 
In sum, the reviewed research indicates that the ease or diffi- 
culty with which information can be recalled, or relevant 
thoughts can be generated, is informative in its own right. 
Which conclusions people draw from their accessibility ex- 
periences depends on which of many potentially applicable 
naive theories they apply. In many cases, a relevant theory is 
recruited by the judgment task itself, although other contex- 
tual influences may bring theories to mind that are unrelated 
to the task. Whenever the accessibility experience seems un- 
informative for the task at hand, people instead turn to re- 
called content. As a result, judgments are (a) consistent with 
the implications of accessible content when recall was expe- 
rienced as easy, but (b) opposite to the implications of re- 
called content when recall was experienced as difficult, un- 
less (c) the informational value of the accessibility 
experience for the judgment at hand is called into question 
through the application of a different naive theory (e.g., I lack 
expertise, I was distracted, and so on). Accordingly, the tru- 
ism that judgments depend on the applicable declarative in- 
formation that comes to mind at the time of judgment fails to 
capture the complexity of the underlying processes. Put sim- 
ply, there is more to thinking than what comes to mind. Simi- 
lar considerations apply to the processing of new informa- 
tion, as the next section illustrates. 
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PROCESSING FLUENCY 
Whereas accessibility experiences pertain to the ease or diffi- 
culty with which information can be recalled or relevant 
thoughts can be generated, processing fluency pertains to the 
ease or difficulty with which new, external information can 
be processed. Empirically, fluency can be manipulated by a 
large number of variables. Some of these variables affect the 
speed and accuracy of low-level processes concerned with 
the identification of a stimulus' physical identity and form; 
they influence perceptual fluency (e.g., Jacoby, Kelley, & 
Dywan, 1989). Relevant variables include figure-ground 
contrast, the clarity with which a stimulus is presented, the 
duration of its presentation, or the amount of previous expo- 
sure to the stimulus. Other variables influence the speed and 
accuracy of high-level processes concerned with the identifi- 
cation of stimulus meaning and its relation to semantic 
knowledge structures; these variables influence conceptual 
fluency (e.g., Whittlesea, 1993). Relevant variables include 
semantic predictability, the consistency between the stimulus 
and its context, and the availability of appropriate mental 
concepts for stimulus classification. 
Empirically, both types of fluency tend to show parallel 
influences on judgments (for a review, see Winkielman, 
Schwarz, Fazendeiro, & Reber, 2003) and can be sub- 
sumed under the general term processing fluency. Pro- 
cessing fluency can be captured with objective measures, 
like processing speed and accuracy, as well as subjective 
measures, like subjective impressions of low effort, high 
speed, and accuracy. 
NAIVE THEORIES 
Because the diverse variables that influence processing flu- 
ency result in similar phenomenological experiences of flu- 
ent processing, the meaning of the experience is open to in- 
terpretation. Which interpretation people choose, and which 
inferences they draw from their experience, again depends on 
the naive theory they bring to bear. Some of these theories 
pertain to characteristics of the stimulus and presentation 
conditions, whereas others pertain to one's own state of 
knowledge. As in the case of accessibility experiences, appli- 
cable theories are recruited by the judgment task and applica- 
tion of one theory usually renders the experience uninforma- 
tive for inferences that require a different theory. I first 
illustrate the operation of different theories and subsequently 
turn to implications of particular interest to consumer re- 
searchers, namely the role of processing fluency in judg- 
ments of truth and preference. 
Stimulus and Presentation Related Theories 
Stimulus-related theories include, for example, the theory 
that it is easier to perceive a stimulus when it is shown with 
high rather than low clarity and the theory that it is easier to 
perceive a stimulus when it is shown for a long rather than 
short duration. These theories affect judgments of clarity and 
duration, even when the fluency experience is due to some 
other variable, like previous exposure to the stimulus. Hence, 
people who saw the stimulus before infer that the current pre- 
sentation lasted longer, or had higher clarity, than people who 
were not previously exposed to the stimulus (e.g., Whittle- 
sea, Jacoby, & Girard, 1990; Witherspoon & Allan, 1985). 
Similarly, Masson and Caldwell(1998) observed that partici- 
pants inferred that a target word was presented for a longer 
duration, or with higher visual clarity, when a preceding se- 
mantic task (e.g., complete the sentence, "An archer shoots a 
bow and " )  had rendered the target word ("arrow") 
highly accessible. In these cases, fluency resulting from pre- 
vious exposure to the stimulus or related concepts gave rise 
to erroneous inferences about physical characteristics of the 
stimulus once the physical judgment task brought an applica- 
ble theory to mind. 
Another naive theory correctly holds that distraction 
makes information more difficult to process. For example, 
Jacoby, Allan, Collins, and Larwill(1988) presented partici- 
pants with new or previously studied sentences, accompa- 
nied by background noise. As expected, participants attrib- 
uted the differential fluency with which they could process 
this material to differential levels of background noise. 
Hence, they rated the noise as louder when combined with 
new rather than old sentences (see also Goldinger, Kleider, & 
Shelley, 1999; and Kelley & Rhodes, 2002, for an extensive 
review). 
Knowledge-Related Theories 
Other naive theories relate processing fluency to one's own 
state of knowledge. The most important one holds that fa- 
miliar (previously seen) material is easier to process. Ac- 
cordingly, people erroneously conclude that novel material 
is familiar when it is easy to process due to the influence of 
other variables. For example, Whittlesea et al. (1990) ex- 
posed participants to a study list of rapidly presented words. 
Subsequently, participants completed a recognition test that 
manipulated the fluency with which test words could be 
processed through differential visual clarity. As expected, 
test words shown with higher clarity seemed more familiar 
and were hence more likely to be recognized as having ap- 
peared on the previous list. This effect was eliminated when 
participants were aware that the clarity of the visual presen- 
tation was manipulated and hence accounted for their expe- 
rience in terms of a theory that rendered it uninformative for 
the recognition task. As Kelley and Rhodes (2002, p. 296) 
concluded on the basis of a comprehensive review, "when 
sources of fluency are noticed and appreciated by the re- 
memberer, enhancements in perceptual processing may be 
attributed to features of the test conditions and so not give 
rise to a feeling of familiarity." 
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Even when processing fluency is correctly attributed to 
previous exposure, it may result in erroneous judgments 
when perceivers misidentify the specific source of the previ- 
ous exposure. For example, previous exposure to a list of 
names of nonfamous individuals may subsequently result in 
erroneous judgments of fame (e.g., Jacoby, Kelley, Brown, & 
Jasechko, 1989; Jacoby & Woloshyn, 1989). This is the case 
when a given name is fluently processed but participants 
can't recollect that they saw it on the earlier list, leading them 
to conclude that the person is probably famous--or else why 
would the name seem familiar? 
As already observed in the context of accessibility experi- 
ences (Sanna, Schwarz, & Small, 2002; Stepper & Strack, 
1993), bodily sensations that convey mental effort can mirror 
the effects of low processing fluency. Strack and Neumann 
(2000) asked participants to rate the fame of famous and 
nonfamous individuals and induced some participants to 
contract the corrugator muscle while doing so (resulting in a 
furrowed brow). As expected, all individuals were rated as 
less famous when participants furrowed their brow than 
when they did not. Apparently, participants misread the feel- 
ing of effort induced by corrugator contraction as low pro- 
cessing fluency resulting from an unfamiliar target. 
Other Theories 
There is probably a large number of other naive theories that 
link fluency of processing to judgments that have so far re- 
mained unexplored. For example, Oppenheimer (2004) pre- 
sented participants with texts that were easy or difficult to 
read, either because the text used simple or complicated 
words or was printed in an easy or difficult to read font. As 
expected, the alleged author of the text was rated as less intel- 
ligent, and less likely to be admitted to graduate school, when 
the text was difficult to process. This suggests a background 
assumption that intelligent authors can express their thoughts 
in easily accessible ways. On the other hand, had participants 
been asked to rate the novelty of the material or their own ex- 
pertise in the area, the same experience of low fluency may 
have suggested high novelty or low expertise in the domain 
(i.e., unfamiliar material is more difficult to process). These 
conjectures, and the previous examples, illustrate the wide 
range of judgments on which fluency experiences can be 
brought to bear and future research will certainly extend this 
list. 
Summary 
In sum, processing fluency can give rise to a wide variety of 
inferences, depending on the naive theory applied. Fluency 
due to physical characteristics of the stimulus presentation 
can serve as input into judgments of one's own knowledge 
("seen before"), much as fluency due to earlier exposure can 
serve as input into judgments of physical characteristics of 
the stimulus (e.g., Witherspoon & Allan, 1985). Once one 
theory is applied, the experience is usually uninformative for 
inferences that require the application of a different theory. 
Moreover, experiences of mental effort resulting from other 
sources, like bodily feedback (Strack & Neumann, 2000), 
can mirror the effects of low processing fluency resulting 
from stimulus characteristics or (lack of) previous exposure. 
JUDGMENTS OF TRUTH 
Fluency-based familiarity inferences have important impli- 
cations for judgments of truth. When the objective truth of a 
statement is difficult to evaluate, people often draw on social 
consensus information to arrive at a judgment, based on the 
assumption that what many people believe is probably true 
(Festinger, 1954). To determine whether they have heard par- 
ticular information before, people may assess the apparent 
familiarity of the information, drawing on the fluency with 
which it can be processed as a relevant input. If so, variables 
that increase processing fluency should increase the per- 
ceived truth value of the processed information. Empirically, 
this is the case. 
Not surprisingly, one relevant variable is actual exposure 
frequency. In a classic study of rumor transmission, Allport 
and Lapkin (1945) observed that the strongest predictor of 
belief in wartime rumors was simple repetition. Numerous 
subsequent studies demonstrated that a given statement is 
more likely to be judged true the more often it is repeated. 
This illusion of truth effect (Begg, Anas, & Farinacci, 1992) 
has been obtained with trivia statements or words from a for- 
eign language (e.g., Hasher, Goldstein, & Toppino, 1977) as 
well as advertising materials (e.g., Hawkins & Hoch, 1992). 
Illusions of truth are even observed when participants are ex- 
plicitly told at the time of exposure that the information is 
false, as a recent study by Skurnik, Yoon, Park, and Schwarz 
(in press) may illustrate. Older and younger adults were ex- 
posed once or thrice to product statements like "shark carti- 
lage is good for your arthritis" and these statements were ex- 
plicitly marked as "true" or "false." Not surprisingly, all 
participants were less likely to accept a statement as true the 
more often they were told that it is false-but only when they 
were tested immediately. After a 3-day delay, repeated warn- 
ings backfired for older adults: They were now more likely to 
assume that a statement is true, the more often they were ex- 
posed to it and were explicitly told that it is false. This finding 
is consistent with the observation that explicit memory de- 
clines with age, whereas implicit memory remains largely in- 
tact (see Park, 2000). Hence, after a 3-day delay, older adults 
could not recall whether the statement was originally marked 
as true or false, but still experienced its content as highly fa- 
miliar, leading them to accept it as true. Ironically, this mech- 
anism turns warnings into recommendations, with important 
implications for educational campaigns. 
Theoretically, any other variable that increases processing 
fluency should have the same effect as message repetition. 
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Supporting this prediction, Reber and Schwarz (1999) found 
that participants were more likely to accept statements like 
"Osorno is a city in Chile" as true when the statements were 
presented in colors that made them easy (e.g., dark blue) 
rather than difficult (e.g., light blue) to read against the back- 
ground. In a conceptually-related study, McGlone and 
Tofighbakhsh (2000) manipulated processing fluency by pre- 
senting substantively equivalent novel aphorisms in a rhym- 
ing (e.g., "woes unite foes") or nonrhyming form (e.g., "woes 
unite enemies"). As expected, participants judged substan- 
tively equivalent aphorisms as more true when they rhymed 
than when they did not. 
In combination, these findings indicate that processing 
fluency serves as an experiential basis of truth judgments. In 
the absence of more diagnostic information, people draw on 
the apparent familiarity of the statement to infer its likely 
truth value-if it seems they heard it before, there's probably 
something to it (Festinger, 1954). This inference involves the 
application of the naive theory that familiar material is easy 
to process-and the application of any other theory (e.g., 
good figure-ground contrast makes things easy to read; 
Reber & Schwarz, 1999) would presumably render the flu- 
ency experience uninformative for truth judgments. 
Finally, fluent processing not only increases judgments of 
truth, but also the feeling that one knew the truth all along, as 
Werth and Strack (2003) recently demonstrated. Following 
the usual procedures of "knew-it-all-along" studies, they pre- 
sented participants with a knowledge question along with the 
answer (e.g., "How high is the Eiffel tower?'-"300 m"). 
Next, participants had to report what they would have an- 
swered had they not been given the solution. The usual find- 
ing is that participants' answers are closer to the true value 
than is the case when that value is not provided. In a novel 
variation on this paradigm, Werth and Strack (2003) pre- 
sented the questions and answers in easy or difficult to read 
colors to manipulate processing fluency. They observed that 
high fluency increased the "knew-it-all-along" effect, 
whereas low fluency attenuated it. Apparently, participants 
found the easy to read versions more familiar and hence con- 
cluded they knew this information all along and thus would 
have provided the correct answer. 
JUDGMENTS OF PREFERENCE 
So far, the reviewed effects of processing fluency follow the 
logic of theory-driven inferences developed in the context of 
accessibility experiences, where the fluency experience itself 
serves as the relevant input. The robust influence of process- 
ing fluency on judgments of liking, preference, and beauty, 
on the other hand, is probably more affective in nature and re- 
flects that processing fluency itself is hedonically marked 
and experienced as positive (for a more detailed discussion, 
see Winkielman, Schwarz, Fazendeiro, & Reber, 2003, 
Winkielman, Schwarz, Reber, & Fazendeiro, 2003). This 
positive affect, in turn, results in more favorable evaluations 
of the stimulus. 
Fluency and Preference 
A growing body of research demonstrates that any variable 
that facilitates fluent processing is likely to increase liking. 
The best known example is the mere exposure effect identi- 
fied by Zajonc (1968): Repeated exposure to an initially neu- 
tral stimulus, without any reinforcement, leads to a gradual 
increase in liking (for reviews, see Bornstein, 1989; Zajonc, 
2000; for limiting conditions, see Bornstein, 1989). Several 
authors proposed that the mere-exposure effect might reflect 
increases in perceptual fluency (e.g., Jacoby, Kelley, & 
Dywan, 1989; Seamon, Brody, & Kauff, 1983, Whittlesea, 
1993). If so, we may expect that any variable that facilitates 
fluent processing similarly results in increased liking, even 
under conditions of a single exposure. Empirically, this is the 
case. 
For example, Reber, Winkielman, and Schwarz (1998, 
Study 1) presented participants with slightly degraded pic- 
tures of everyday objects and manipulated processing flu- 
ency through a visual priming procedure. Depending on con- 
ditions, the target picture was preceded by a subliminally 
presented, highly degraded contour of either the target pic- 
ture or a different picture. As expected, pictures preceded by 
matched contours were recognized faster, indicating higher 
fluency, and were liked more than pictures preceded by mis- 
matched contours. Moreover, participants were unaware of 
the fluency manipulation, thus eliminating the possibility of 
strategic responding to pictures preceded by various primes. 
Extending this work, Winkielman and Fazendeiro (2003; re- 
ported in Winluelman, Schwarz, Fazendeiro, & Reber, 2003) 
showed participants unambiguous pictures of common ob- 
jects and manipulated processing fluency through semantic 
primes. In the high fluency condition, the picture (e.g., of a 
lock) was preceded by a matching word ("lock"), in the mod- 
erate fluency condition by an associatively related word (e.g., 
"key"), and in the low fluency condition by an unrelated 
word (e.g., "snow"). As predicted, pictures preceded by 
matching words were liked significantly more than pictures 
preceded by related words, which, in turn, were liked signifi- 
cantly more than pictures preceded by unrelated words. Fol- 
low-up studies indicated that these fluency effects do not re- 
quire that the concept primes immediately precede the target 
pictures. Instead, the same pattern of effects was obtained 
when participants studied a list of concept primes well before 
they were exposed to the pictures. Lee and Labroo (in press) 
obtained similar findings in the consumer domain and found, 
for example, that consumers reported more positive attitudes 
toward ketchup when they were previously exposed to a 
closely related product (mayonnaise) rather than an unrelated 
one (vitamins). 
A host of other variables that affect processing fluency 
shows parallel effects, from figure-ground contrast and pre- 
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sentation duration (e.g., Reber et al., 1998) to the proto- 
typicality of the stimulus (e.g., Halberstadt & Rhodes, 2000; 
Langlois & Roggman, 1990). Moreover, the influence of 
many variables addressed in the psychology of aesthetics 
(see Arnheim, 1974; Tatarkiewicz, 1970), like figural good- 
ness, symmetry, and information density, can be traced to the 
mediating role of processing fluency (for a comprehensive 
review, see Reber, Schwarz, & Winkielman, in press). In 
combination, these findings suggest that aesthetic pleasure 
may be grounded in the processing experience of the 
perceiver. It is also worth noting that the parallel effects of 
processing fluency on judgments of truth and aesthetic pref- 
erence shed new light on Keats's famous assertion that 
"beauty is truth, truth beauty, that is all ye need know" 
(Keats, 182111988, p. 310), both beauty and truth are in part 
judged on the basis of the same experiential information. 
Affective Response 
Importantly, the influence of processing fluency is not lim- 
ited to explicit judgments of preference, but can also be cap- 
tured with psychophysiological measures. For example, 
Winkielman and Cacioppo (200 1 ; see also Harmon-Jones & 
Allen, 2001) assessed participants' affective responses to flu- 
ent stimuli with facial electromyography (EMG). This meth- 
odology relies on the observation that positive affective re- 
sponses increase activity over the region of the zygomaticus 
major ("smiling muscle"), whereas negative affective re- 
sponses increase activity over the region of the cormgator 
supercilli ("frowning muscle;" e.g., Cacioppo, Petty, Losch, 
& Kim, 1986). As expected, high fluency was associated 
with stronger activity over the zygomaticus region (indica- 
tive of positive affect), but was not associated with the activ- 
ity of the corrugator region (indicative of negative affect). 
Moreover, the observed differences occurred in the first 3 sec 
after stimulus presentation, indicating a spontaneous affec- 
tive response to processing fluency. Similarly, Monahan, 
Murphy, and Zajonc (2000) observed that repeated exposure 
to initially neutral stimuli improved participants' self-re- 
ported mood. 
As Winkielman, Schwarz, Fazendeiro, and Reber (2003) 
proposed, this spontaneous affective response presumably 
mediates the impact of fluency on preference judgments, par- 
alleling the influence of other affective states on evaluation 
(for a review, see Schwarz & Clore, 1996). Supporting this 
assumption, Winkielman and Fazendeiro (2003) observed 
that the influence of fluency on liking was eliminated when 
participants attributed their positive affective response to mu- 
sic played in the background. What is less clear is why pro- 
cessing fluency is experienced as affectively positive. Rele- 
vant proposals range from the adaptive value of a preference 
for familiar stimuli (Zajonc, 1968) to the adaptive value of 
fast stimulus identification (Winkielman, Schwarz, & 
Nowak, 2002) and their empirical evaluation awaits further 
research. 
Finally, it is worth noting that the relation between per- 
ceived familiarity and affective response is bidirectional. As 
Monin (2003) demonstrated, stimuli that evoke a positive af- 
fective response are judged more familiar, even when fluency 
of processing is controlled for. Similarly, Garcia-Marques 
and Mackie (2001) observed that participants in a good mood 
are more likely to perceive novel arguments as familiar, 
which may contribute to their acceptance as true. 
Summary 
In sum, processing fluency influences different judgments 
through two different pathways, both of which involve reli- 
ance on experiential information. On the one hand, perceived 
fluency of processing influences judgments of physical stim- 
ulus characteristics, familiarity, and truth, through the appli- 
cation of naive theories, which provide relevant inference 
rules. The relevant input for these judgments is the fluency 
experience itself. On the other hand, fluency elicits spontane- 
ous affective reactions, which can be captured by psycho- 
physiological measures (e.g., Winkielman & Cacioppo, 
2001). These affective reactions, in turn, serve as input for 
preference judgments. However, neither source of experien- 
tial information exerts an influence when its informational 
value is called into question. This is the case when judges are 
aware that their fluency experience (for a review, see Kelley 
& Rhodes, 2002) or apparent affective reaction to the target 
(for a review, see Schwarz & Clore, 1996) is due to an irrele- 
vant source. 
Finally, some phenomena may reflect the operation of 
both processes. Studying the role of processing fluency in 
consumer choice, Novemsky et al. (2003) presented partici- 
pants with descriptions of two digital cameras, printed in a 
font that was easy or difficult to read. As expected, partici- 
pants were less likely to defer choice when the description 
was easy (56% deferral) rather than difficult to read (7 1% de- 
ferral), unless their attention was drawn to this characteristic 
of the font (57% deferral). This result may reflect that the de- 
scribed camera seemed less attractive under low fluency con- 
ditions or that the information seemed less credible, both of 
which would contribute to a higher rate of deferral. In either 
case, the finding highlights that the fluency with which con- 
sumers can process product information enters into the deci- 
sion process, as has been observed for accessibility experi- 
ences (Novemsky et al., 2003). 
CONCLUSIONS, IMPLICATIONS, 
AND OPEN ISSUES 
The reviewed research demonstrates that there is more to 
thinking than thought content: The subjective experiences 
that accompany our thought processes are informative in 
their own right. We therefore can't understand human judg- 
ment and decision making without taking the interplay of de- 
clarative and experiential information into account. In this fi- 
nal section, I address some theoretical issues raised by these 
observations and offer some conjectures that go beyond the 
data given. 
Inferences and Naive Theories 
People generally assume that the thoughts that come to mind 
while thinking about X are relevant to X-or why else would 
they come to mind at this point? Higgins (1998) referred to 
this pervasive tendency in the perceived relevance of declara- 
tive information as the aboutness principle of human infer- 
ence. The perceived relevance of our thoughts is further en- 
hanced when they come to mind easily (Clore, 1992; 
Higgins, 1998; Menon & Raghubir, 2003). By the same to- 
ken, any subjective experience we have while thinktng about 
X also seems relevant to X (which Clore, Wyer, Dienes, 
Gasper, Gohm, & Isbell, 2001, termed the immediacy princi- 
ple of affective information). From this perspective, our 
thoughts and experiences while thinlung about X seem rele- 
vant by default and do not require a deliberate attribution to X 
to serve as input into X-related judgments. 
What exactly we conclude from these "relevant" inputs 
depends on accessible background knowledge that provides 
a link between X and the input. I refer to these links as naive 
theories and assume that they are rendered accessible by the 
respective judgment task, as illustrated by the examples dis- 
cussed earlier. Their high contextual accessibility presum- 
ably contributes to the perception that the naive theory is rele- 
vant and applicable, consistent with the reviewed findings. 
Note also that this logic holds as well for inferences drawn 
from declarative information, although this is rarely made 
explicit in content-focused models of judgment. When we 
learn that Bob solved the New York Times crossword puzzle 
in record time, we are likely to conclude that he is smart. Yet 
we would not arrive at this conclusion without a naive theory 
which entails that solving crossword puzzles in record time 
requires intelligence. As research into the automaticity of 
trait inferences illustrates (for a review, see Uleman, 1999), 
people often apply their naive theories automatically. Hence, 
the conclusion that Bob is smart appears as an immediate im- 
pression rather than a deliberate inference, and the inferential 
steps are unlikely to show up in think-aloud protocols. In 
much the same way, fluently processed stimuli just "feel" fa- 
miliar and the person is unlikely to have the phenomenal ex- 
perience of going through an inference process akin to "Pre- 
viously seen stimuli are easy to recognize. This one was easy, 
so I probably saw it before." 
In sum, I assume that the inference processes involved in 
the use of experiential information are largely automatic and 
that individuals can usually not report on them introspec- 
tively. This assumption does not preclude, however, that na- 
ive theories can be used in a deliberate way, for example, 
when the theory is novel and unfamiliar (as was the case for 
the suggested theories in Winkielman & Schwarz, 2001). In 
contrast, the disuse of experiential information is often delib- 
erate, as addressed later. 
Expectations 
In general, the influence of experiential information is more 
pronounced, the more the experience deviates from expected 
baseline values. That is, the relative intensity of the experi- 
ence is more important than its absolute level. This was first 
observed for the influence of moods, where moods marked as 
"neutral" on manipulation checks typically have effects that 
resemble the influence of negative moods. Because most 
people are in a slightly positive mood most of the time, neu- 
tral moods are experienced as a negative deviation (for a dis- 
cussion, see Schwarz, 1987). The same is likely to hold true 
for accessibility and fluency experiences, although little is 
known about the relevant baseline expectations. When ex- 
pectations are experimentally manipulated, however, unex- 
pected fluency has been found to be more influential than ex- 
pected fluency (e.g., Whittlesea & Williams, 1998, 2000). 
Similarly, difficulty of recall exerts no influence when people 
are aware of their own lack of expertise in the domain and 
presumably expect recall to be difficult to begin with, as dis- 
cussed earlier. Understanding the nature of the relevant ex- 
pectations, and their contextual determinants, is an important 
issue for future research. 
Awareness and Discounting 
Whenever people are aware that their experience may be due 
to a source that is unrelated to the judgment task, the other- 
wise observed influence is eliminated. This is usually por- 
trayed as a discounting effect, but may reflect two different 
processes. I illustrate both with research into the misattri- 
bution of mood and arousal before I turn to metacognitive ex- 
periences. 
The first possibility is, as commonly assumed, a straight- 
forward attributional discounting effect (Kelley, 1972), 
which renders the experience uninformative for the judgment 
at hand. For example, Schwarz and Clore (1983) observed 
that people were in a poorer mood and reported lower general 
life-satisfaction on rainy than on sunny days. Drawing their 
attention to the rainy weather eliminated the influence of 
negative moods on life-satisfaction judgments, but did not 
change the mood itself. People still felt bad on rainy days, but 
they did not infer from this momentary feeling that their life 
as a whole was unsatisfactory once they realized that their 
current mood may only be due to the weather. Such discount- 
ing effects require awareness of an irrelevant source of the 
experience and are usually deliberate in nature. 
The second possibility is that awareness of another source 
prompts the application of a different naive theory, which 
may result in a different phenomenal experience. Suppose, 
for example, that participants watch a fear-arousing video 
and are given the opportunity to misattribute the resulting 
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physiological arousal to the side-effects of a placebo pill 
(Schwarz, Servay, & Kumpf, 1985). In this case, the pill pro- 
vides an applicable theory that lends itself to an interpreta- 
tion of the experienced arousal in terms unrelated to 
fear--and, in fact, participants reported lower fear under this 
condition. This process again requires awareness of the (al- 
leged) source of arousal (the pill), but the subsequent use of 
the resulting experience in judgment may be automatic-and 
the lack of a fear effect does not necessarily mean that experi- 
enced fear was discounted; instead, it may never have been 
experienced to begin with. 
In either case, the experiential information has different 
implications for subsequent judgments, but for different rea- 
sons: In the first case, the feeling per se is unaffected, but ren- 
dered differentially informative for the judgment at hand 
(Schwarz & Clore, 1983); in the latter case, the feeling is 
qualitatively different (fear vs. mere bodily arousal) and 
hence influences subsequent judgments in different ways 
(Schwarz et al., 1985). These possibilities bear on the influ- 
ence of metacognitive experiences, but have received little at- 
tention. 
Accessibility experiences. The informational value 
of accessibility experiences is undermined when people at- 
tribute the experience to an irrelevant influence, like back- 
ground music (e.g., Schwarz et al., 1991), features of the pre- 
sentation format (e.g., Wanke et al., 1995), or other 
contextual influences (e.g., Oppenheimer, in press). Con- 
versely, their informational value is enhanced when people 
perceive extraneous influences that run counter to their expe- 
rience, for example, when they find a recall task easy despite 
influences that should make it difficult (e.g., Wanke et al., 
1995). These are "classic" discounting and augmentation ef- 
fects (Kelley, 1972), which influence the perceived informa- 
tional value of the experience, but not necessarily the experi- 
ence itself-the task still is difficult, for example, but that has 
little to say, given that it is apparently due to a distracting ex- 
traneous influence. Such discounting and augmentation pro- 
cesses are deliberate and require mental resources. Accord- 
ingly, Menon and Raghubir (2003, Study 4) observed that 
discounting cues only eliminated ease-of-recall effects when 
participants were not under cognitive load. Participants who 
were under cognitive load continued to rely on accessibility 
experiences despite the presence of discounting cues. This 
pattern is consistent with the assumption that the use of ac- 
cessibility experiences is relatively automatic and effortless, 
whereas their disuse is deliberate. 
However, the consideration of naive theories suggests ad- 
ditional ways in which accessibility experiences can lose 
their informational value for the judgment at hand. To return 
to my earlier example, being unable to recall many excellent 
new restaurants in Chicago, I may conclude, among many 
other things, that there aren't many or that I'm apparently not 
paying much attention to new restaurants. Once I draw the 
latter inference, my difticulty of recall is utterly uninforma- 
tive for whether there are many new restaurants. That is, us- 
ing a given experience as input into a judgment that requires 
application of theory X renders the experience uninformative 
for judgments that require theory Y. Given that my initial use 
of the experience may be effortless and automatic, this pro- 
cess may result in unintended and nondeliberate discounting 
effects that follow from previous judgments. This possibility 
deserves systematic investigation. 
Finally, Menon and Raghubir (2003, Study 3) observed 
that discounting cues were only effective when they were in- 
troduced prior to the recall task. Other studies, however, ob- 
tained successful discounting even when the discounting 
cues were introduced after the recall task (e.g., Sanna & 
Schwarz, 2003; Sanna, Schwarz, & Small, 2002). Theo- 
retically, the crucial variable is not the temporal relation be- 
tween the recall task and the discounting cue (as Menon & 
Raghubir, 2003, suggested), but the temporal relation be- 
tween the recall task and the judgment. In the Menon and 
Raghubir (2003) studies, participants recalled product attrib- 
utes and may have spontaneously formed product judgments 
along the way, prior to receiving the discounting cue. In con- 
trast, participants in the hindsight studies by Sanna and col- 
leagues generated ways in which an obtained event could 
have turned out otherwise, and subsequently judged their 
prior likelihood expectations for the event (Sanna, Schwarz, 
& Small, 2002) or recalled the likelihood judgments that they 
had reported earlier (Sanna & Schwarz, 2003). It seems un- 
likely that participants would make such judgments sponta- 
neously while thinking about alternative outcomes. In com- 
bination, these findings suggest that people can discount 
their accessibility experiences even when the discounting 
cues follow rather than precede the subjective experience. 
But when they form a spontaneous judgment prior to receiv- 
ing discounting information, they cannot undo the previous 
influence of subjective experience, consistent with the extant 
literature on mental contamination and correction (see Strack 
& Hannover, 1996; Wilson & Brecke, 1994). 
Processing fluency As in the case of accessibility ex- 
periences, the use of processing fluency as a source of infor- 
mation is largely automatic. Moreover, people are unlikely to 
be aware of the tacit inferential steps that guided their re- 
sponses. Thus, a fluently processed stimulus just feels famil- 
iar and the person does not have a phenomenal experience of 
going through inferential steps akin to "Previously seen ma- 
terial is easy to recognize. I recognized this one quickly, so I 
must have seen it before." As Kelley and Rhodes (2002, p. 
295) put it, the person attributes fluency of processing to pre- 
vious experience "unconsciously-the conscious experience 
of fluent processing is that something seems familiar." 
When the person is aware that fluency may result from a 
source that is irrelevant to the judgment at hand (e.g., the pre- 
sentation format), however, the otherwise observed effects 
are again eliminated. On the one hand, this may reflect a de- 
liberate discounting process. On the other hand, awareness of 
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differences in the presentation format may trigger the appli- 
cation of a different naive theory, resulting, for example, in 
subjective experiences of higher clarity or loudness, as re- 
viewed earlier. If so, feelings of familiarity, which require the 
application of a different naive theory, may never arise to be- 
gin with (see Kelley & Rhodes, 2002, p. 296, for a related dis- 
cussion). This possibility is analogous to undermining the in- 
formational value of accessibility experience~ through their 
use in previous judgments in which a different naive theory 
was applied. 
I suppose that both of these pathways to undermining the 
informational value of metacognitive experiences are viable, 
as suggested by earlier misattribution research into moods 
and emotions (e.g., Schwarz & Clore, 1983; Schwarz et al., 
1985). Exploring these different possibilities in the case of 
metacognitive experiences provides a promising avenue for 
future research. 
Motivation 
At present, little is known about the role of processing moti- 
vation in the use of fluency experiences. Theoretically, I 
would expect that people are more likely to assess the 
diagnosticity of their experiences under high motivation con- 
ditions, rendering discounting effects more likely, but rele- 
vant data are not available. 
With regard to accessibility experiences, the bulk of the 
available work suggests that low motivation, manipulated 
through low personal relevance (e.g., Grayson & Schwarz, 
1999; Rothman & Schwarz, 1998), low need for cognition 
(Florack & Zoabi, 2003), or happy moods (Ruder & Bless, 
2003), foster reliance on accessibility experiences. In con- 
trast, high motivation, manipulated through high personal 
relevance (e.g., Grayson & Schwarz, 1999; Rothman & 
Schwarz, 1998), sad moods (Ruder & Bless, 2003), or in- 
structions (Aarts & Dijksterhuis, 1999), attenuate the influ- 
ence of accessibility experiences and foster reliance on ac- 
cessible content. Exceptions to this generalization have been 
observed in persuasion paradigms (e.g., Wanke & Bless, 
2000), as discussed earlier. People's high reliance on experi- 
ential information under low motivation conditions renders 
these inputs particularly relevant for many consumer and ad- 
vertising contexts. 
It is also worth noting that we have not observed self-serv- 
ing tendencies in the selection of inputs, although the experi- 
mental paradigm used in many ease of retrieval studies would 
lend itself easily to motivated biases. Suppose, for example, 
that you are asked to recall many behaviors that increase or 
decrease your risk of heart disease and find this task difficult 
(Rothman & Schwarz, 1998). After recalling risk-increasing 
behaviors, you could arrive at the presumably desired infer- 
ence of low risk by drawing on your accessibility experi- 
ence-given that it is so hard to think of risk-increasing be- 
haviors, you apparently don't do much that puts you at risk. 
Conversely, you'd like to rely on recalled content when your 
recall task pertained to risk-decreasing behaviors-given 
that you recalled so many, you apparently do a lot to prevent 
high risk. We have not observed such motivated switches in 
the selection of applicable inputs (Rothman & Schwarz, 
1998; see also, Grayson & Schwarz, 1999). Instead, people 
for whom heart disease was personally relevant due to their 
family history drew on recalled content, independent of 
whether this resulted in a favorable or unfavorable conclu- 
sion. Conversely, people for whom heart disease was of low 
personal relevance drew on their accessibility experiences, 
again independent of the resulting conclusion. Given that 
people are likely to select self-serving inputs when they can 
justify their use (for reviews, see Dunning, 2001; Kunda, 
1999), this suggests that the phenomenal experience has a 
compelling immediacy in the absence of salient discounting 
cues. 
Metacognitive Experiences and 
Processing Style 
To date, research into metacognitive experiences is limited to 
their use as inputs into judgments. Given the extensive paral- 
lels to other sources of experiential information, such as 
moods, emotions, and bodily sensations, it is tempting to 
speculate about the role of metacognitive experiences in the 
choice of processing strategies. 
As a growing body of research indicates, any information 
that conveys that one's current situation is problematic in- 
creases the likelihood that people engage in a systematic, 
bottom-up processing style that is characterized by consider- 
able attention to the information at hand. Conversely, any in- 
formation that conveys that one's current situation is benign 
increases the likelihood that people rely on business-as-usual 
strategies, resulting in a more heuristic, top-down processing 
style (for a review, see Schwarz, 2002). Thus, people who are 
in a sad rather than happy mood process persuasive messages 
more systematically (for a review, see Schwarz, Bless, & 
Bohner, 1991); rely less on stereotypes and more on individ- 
uating information (for a review see Bless, Schwarz, & 
Kemmelmeier, 1996); and perform better on analytic prob- 
lem-solving tasks, but are less likely to engage in the playful 
thinking that fosters creativity (for a review, see Schwarz & 
Skurnik, 2003). Similarly, bodily avoidance feedback pro- 
vided by arm extension (a problem signal) improves perfor- 
mance on analytic tasks, whereas bodily approach feedback 
provided by arm flexion (a benign signal) improves perfor- 
mance on creativity tasks (Friedman & Forster, 2000,2002). 
Even external signals that convey differential affect, like the 
upbeat or depressed color of the paper on which a task is pre- 
sented, have been found to influence processing strategy and 
performance (Sinclair, Soldat, & Mark, 1998; Soldat, 
Sinclair, & Mark, 1997). These effects can be conceptualized 
by assuming that human cognition is situated and adaptively 
tuned to meet the processing requirements of the situation, 
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requirements that are signaled by immediate affective re- 
sponses (see Schwarz, 2002). 
In light of these findings, it seems likely that low process- 
ing fluency may give rise to more deliberate, systematic pro- 
cessing strategies than high processing fluency. This conjec- 
ture is compatible with the observation that fluently 
processed information seems more familiar and is more 
likely to be accepted as true, as reviewed earlier, either of 
which would reduce the likelihood of further systematic 
scrutiny. Similarly, difficulty of recall or thought generation 
may undermine confidence in one's thoughts and trigger 
more effortful processing, consistent with Tormala et al.'s 
(2002) self-validation hypothesis. These possibilities also 
await further research. 
Variability of Inferences 
As already emphasized, the conclusions that people may 
draw from their metacognitive experiences are as variable as 
the naive theories they may bring to bear. This renders the 
outcomes more variable than has previously been assumed. 
With regard to accessibility experiences, for example, our 
early studies were guided by Tversky and Kahneman's 
(1973) availability heuristic (for a review, see Schwarz & 
Vaughn, 2002). The conceptualization proposed here, how- 
ever, suggests that the availability heuristic is just one of 
many applicable naive theories, albeit a particularly impor- 
tant one. Exploring the naive theories of memory and cogni- 
tion that people may apply is likely to uncover numerous in- 
fluences of metacognitive experience~ that have so far gone 
unnoticed. 
Moreover, we know little about the theories that observers 
apply when they watch performances that differ in ease and 
fluency. For example, Kruger, Wirtz, Van Boven, and 
Altermatt (2004) proposed "that effort is used as a heuristic 
for quality" (p. 91). In their experiments, participants rated 
the quality and value of poems, paintings, and suits of armor, 
more favorably when they thought that it took much time and 
effort to produce them. But would they have arrived at the 
same conclusion if they had watched the artist struggle with 
the material? Or would they have inferred inferior talent from 
the artist's difficulty? Again, different naive theories may be 
recruited when asked to evaluate the quality of the product 
versus the talent of the producer-and the order in which 
both tasks are presented may very well reverse the outcome. 
Thus, the initial judgments of high quality observed by 
Kruger et al. (2004) can reverse the outcome. Indeed, the in- 
fluence of perceived effort on judgments of quality is elimi- 
nated when participants first assess the artist's talent (Cho & 
Schwarz, 2004). 
Finally, I am not aware of any studies that addressed the 
role of metacognitive experiences at the group level, for ex- 
ample, in the context of group decision making. Presumably, 
a group would find it easier to generate many reasons in favor 
of a decision alternative than any of its members alone, spar- 
ing participants the difficulty of thought generation they may 
experience individually. Does the ease of collective thought 
generation influence judgments and decisions in ways that 
parallel the effects observed at the individual level? Under 
which conditions, if any, do members discount the ease of 
collective thought generation by taking into account that the 
task is easier for groups than for individuals? Conversely, is a 
collective experience of difficulty considered particularly di- 
agnostic? The answers to these questions will presumably 
depend on members' naive theories of group performance, 
yet these theories are largely unknown. Exploring them may 
fill an important gap in our understanding of group decision 
making. 
ACKNOWLEDGMENT 
I thank Daphna Oyserman and Piotr Winkielman for helpful 
comments on an earlier draft. 
REFERENCES 
Aarts, H., & Dijksterhuis, A. (1999). How often did I do it? Experienced 
ease of retrieval and frequency estimates of past behavior. Acta 
Psychologica, 103, 77-89. 
Allport, F. H., & Lepkin, M. (1945). Wartime rumors of waste and special 
privilege: Why some people believe them. Journal ofAbnorma1 and So- 
cial Psychology, 40, 3-36. 
Arnheim, R. (1974). Art and visualperception: A psychology of the creative 
eye. Berkeley: University of California Press. 
Begg, I. M., Anas, A,, & Farinacci, S. (1992). Dissociation of processes in 
belief: Source recollection, statement familiarity, and the illusion of truth. 
Journal ofExperimenta1 Psychology: General, 121, 446-458. 
Biller, B., Bless, H., & Schwarz, N. (1992, April). Die Leichtigkeir der 
Erinnerung als Information in der Urteilsbildung: Der EinfluJ der 
Fragenreihenfolge [Ease of recall as information: The impact of question 
order]. Paper presented at Tagung experimentell arbeitender 
Psychologen, Osnabriick, FRG. 
Bishop, G. F. (1987). Context effects on self-perceptions of interest in gov- 
ernment and public affairs. In H. J. Hippler, N. Schwarz, & S. Sudman 
(Eds.), Social information processing and survey methodology (pp. 
179-199). New York: Springer-Verlag. 
Bless, H., Schwarz, N., & Kemmelmeier, M. (1996). Mood and stereotyp- 
ing: The impact of moods on the use of general knowledge structures. Eu- 
ropean Review of Social Psycholog); 7, 63-93. 
Bornstein, R. F. (1989). Exposure and affect: Overview and meta-analysis of 
research 1968-1987. Psychological Bulletin, 106, 265-289. 
Cacioppo, J. T., Petty, R. E., Losch, M. E., & Kim, H. S. (1986). 
Electromyographic activity over facial muscle regions can differentiate 
the valence and intensity of affective reactions. Journal of Personaliq and 
Social Psychology, 50, 260-268. 
Cho, H., & Schwarz, N. (2004). Of great art and untalented artists: Di- 
verging inferences from effort information. Unpublished manuscript, Uni- 
versity of Michigan. 
Clore, G. L. (1992). Cognitive phenomenology: Feelings and the construc- 
tion of judgment. In L. L. Martin & A. Tesser (Eds.), The construction of 
social judgments (pp. 133-164). Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Asso- 
ciates, Inc. 
Clore, G. L., Wyer R. S., Dienes, B., Gasper, K., Gohm, C. L., & Isbell, L. 
(2001). Affective feelings as feedback: Some cognitive consequences. In 
346 SCHWARZ 
L. L. Martin & G. L. Clore (Eds.), Theories of mood und cognition: A 
user's handbook (pp. 27-62). Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associ- 
ates, Inc. 
Dunning, D. (2001). On the motives underlying social cognition. In A. 
Tesser & N. Schwarz (Eds.), lntraindividual processes (pp. 348-374). 
Oxford, England: Blackwell. 
Eagly, A. H., & Chaiken, S. (1 993). Thepsychology of attitudes. Fon Worth, 
T X :  Harcourt Brace Jovanovich. 
Fazendeiro, T., & Winkielman, P. (2003). Effects of conceptualfZuency on 
affective judgmenu und psychophysiological responses. Unpublished 
manuscript, University of Denver. 
Festinger, L. (1954). A theory of social comparison processes. Human Rela- 
tions, 7, 123-146. 
Fischhoff, B. (1975). Hindsight foresight: The effect of outcome knowl- 
edge on judgment under uncertainty. Journal of Experimental Psychol- 
ogy: Human Perception und Performance, 1, 288-299. 
Fischhoff, B. (1982a). Debiasing. In D. Kahneman, P. Slovic, & A. Tversky 
(Eds.), Judgment under uncertainty: Heuristics und biases (pp. 422- 
444). New York: Cambridge University Press. 
Fischhoff, B. (1982b). For those condemned to study the past: Heuristics and 
biases in hindsight. In D. Kahneman, P. Slovic, & A. Tversky (Eds.), 
Judgment under uncertainty: Heuristics und biases (pp. 332- 35 1). New 
York: Cambridge University Press. 
Florack, A., & Zoabi, H. (2003). Risikoverhalten bei Aktiengeschäften: 
Wenn Anleger nachdenklich werden [Risk behavior in share transactions: 
When investors think about reasons]. Zeitschr~fijür Sozialpsychologie, 
34, 65-78. 
Friedman, R. S., & Förster, J. (2000). The effects of approach and avoidance 
motor actions on the elements of creative insight. Journal of Personality 
& Social Psychology, 79, 477492. 
Friedinan, R. S., & Förster, J. (2002). The influence of approach and avoid- 
ance motor actions on creative cognition. Journal ofExperimenta1 Social 
Psychology, 38, 41 -55. 
Garcia-Marques, T., & Mackie, D. M. (2001). The feeling of familiarity as a 
regulator of persuasive processing. Social Cognition, 19, 9-34. 
Goldinger, S. D., Kleider, H. M., & Shelley, E. (1999). The marriage of per- 
ception and memory: Creating two-way illusions between words and 
voices. Memory & Cognition, 27, 328-338. 
Grayson, C. E., & Schwarz, N. (1999). Beliefs influence information pro- 
cessing strategies: Declarative and experiential information in risk assess- 
ment. Social Cognition, 17, 1-18. 
Haddock, G. (2002). It's easy to like or dislike Tony Blair: Accessibility ex- 
periences and the favorability of attitude judgments. British Journal of So- 
cial Psychology, 93, 257-267. 
Haddock, G., Rothman, A. J., Reber, R., & Schwarz, N. (1999). Forming 
judgments of attitude certainty, importance, and intensity: The role of 
subjective experiences. Personality und Social Psychology Bulletin, 25. 
771-782. 
Haddock, G., Rothman, A., & Schwarz, N. (1996). Are (some) reports of at- 
titude strength context dependent? Canadian Journal of Behavioral Sci- 
ence, 24, 313-317. 
Halberstadt, J., & Rhodes, G. (2000). The attractiveness of nonface average: 
Implications for an evolutionary explanation of the attractiveness of aver- 
age faces. P~ychological Science, 11, 285-289. 
Harmon-Jones, E., &Allen, J. J. B. (2001). The role of affect in the mere ex- 
posure effect: Evidence from psychophysiological and individual differ- 
ences approaches. Personality und Social Psychology Bulletin, 27, 
889-898. 
Hasher, L., Goldstein, D., & Toppino, T. (1977). Frequency and the confer- 
ence of referential validity. Journal of Verbal Learning und Verbal Behav- 
ioz 16, 107-1 12. 
Hawkins, S. A., & Hastie, R. (1990). Hindsight: Biased judgment of past 
events after the outcomes are known. Psychological Bulletin, 107, 
311-327 
Hawkins, S. A., & Hoch, S. J. (1992). Low-involvement leaming: Memory 
without evaluation. Journal of Consumer Research, 19, 2 12-225. 
Higgins, E. T. (1996). Knowledge activation: Accessibility, applicability, 
and salience. In E. T. Higgins & A. Kruglanski (Eds.), Socialpsychology: 
Handbook of basic principles (pp. 133-168). New York: Guilford. 
Higgins, E. T. (1998). The aboutness principle: A pervasive influence on hu- 
man inference. Social Cognition, 16, 173-198. 
Jacoby, L. L., Allan, L. G., Collins, J. C., & Larwill, L. K. (1988). Memory 
influences subjective experience: Noise judgments. Journal of Experi- 
mental Psychology: Learning, Memory, und Cognition, 14, 240-247. 
Jacoby, L. L., Kelley, C. M., Brown, J., & Jaseschko, J. (1989). Becoming fa- 
mous overnight: Limits on the ability to avoid unconscious influences of 
the past. Journal of Personality und Social Psychology, 56, 326-338. 
Jacoby, L. L., Kelley, C. M., & Dywan, J. (1989). Memory attributions. In H. 
L. Roediger & F. I. M. Craik (Eds.), Varieties of memory und conscious- 
ness: Essays in honour of Ende1 Tulving (pp. 391422). Hillsdale, NJ: 
Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Inc. 
Jacoby, L. L., & Whitehouse, K. (1989). An illusion of memory: False rec- 
ognition influenced by unconscious perception. Journal ofExperimenta1 
Psychology: General, 118, 126-135. 
Jacoby, L. L., & Woloshyn, V. (1 989). Becoming famous without being rec- 
ognized: Unconscious influences of memory produced by divided atten- 
tion. Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, 188, 115-1 25. 
Keats, J. (1988). Ode on a Grecian um. In The complete poems (3rd ed., pp. 
308-310. London, England: Penguin. 
Kelley, C. M., & Rhodes, M. G. (2002). Making sense aiid nonsense of expe- 
rience: Attributions in memory and judgment. The Psychology of 
Learning und Motivation, 41, 293-320. 
Kelley, H. H. (1972). Causa1 schemata und the attribution process. 
Morristown, NJ: General Learning Press. 
Kmger, J., Wirtz, D., Van Boven, L., & Altermatt, T. W. (2004). The effort 
heuristic. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 40, 91-98. 
Kunda, 2. (1999). Social cognition. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 
Langlois, J. H., & Roggman, L. A. (1990). Attractive faces are only average. 
Psychological Science, I ,  1 15-12 1 . 
Lasorsa, D. L. (2003). Question order effects in surveys: The case of politi- 
cal interest, news attention, and knowledge. Journalism & Muss Commu- 
nication Quarterly, 80, 499-512. 
Lee, A. Y., & Labroo, A. A. (2004). The effect of conceptual and perceptual 
fluency on brand evaluation. Journal of Marketing Research, 41, 
151-165. 
Masson, M. E. J., & Caldwell, J. I. (1998). Conceptually driven encoding 
episodes create perceptual misattributions. Acta Psychologica, 98, 
183-210. 
McGlone, M. S., & Tofighbakhsh, J. (2000). Birds of a feather flock con- 
jointly (?): Rhyme as reason in aphorisms. Psychological Science, 11, 
424-428. 
Menon, G., & Raghubir, P. (2003). Ease of retrieval as an automatic input in 
judgments: A mere-accessibility framework? Journal of Consumer Re- 
search, 30, 230-243. 
Monahan, J. L., Murphy, S. T., & Zajonc, R. B. (2000). Subliminal mere ex- 
posure: Specific, general, and diffuse effects. Psychological Science, 11, 
462466.  
Monin, B. (2003). The warm glow heuristic: When liking leads to familiar- 
ity. Journal of Personality und Social Psychology, 85, 1035-1048. 
Nelson, T. O., & Narens, L. (1990). Metamemory: A theoretical framework 
and some new findings. In G. H. Bower (Ed.), Thepsychology offearning 
und motivation (Vol. 26, pp. 125-173). San Diego, CA: Academic. 
Novemsky, N., Dhar, R., Simonson, I , ,  & Schwarz, N. (2003, October). Pref- 
erence fluency and its effects on no-choice, compromise, and attraction 
effects. In N. Novemsky (Chair), Newfrontiers in the constructiort ofpref 
erences. Symposium conducted at the meeting of the Association for 
Consumer Research, Toronto, Ontario, Canada. 
Oppenheimer, D. (2004). Consequences oj'erudite vernacular utilized irre- 
spective of necessity: Problems with using long words needlessly. Manu- 
scnpt submitted for publication. 
Oppenheimer, D. (2004). Spontaneous discounting of availability in fre- 
quency judgment tasks. Psychological Science, 15, 10C105. 
METACOGNITIVE EXPERIENCES 347 
Park, D. C. (2000). The basic mechanisms accounting for age-related de- 
cline in cognitive function. In D. C. Park & N. Schwarz (Eds.), Cognitive 
aging: A primer (pp 3-22). Philadelphia: Psychology Press. 
Petty, R. E., & Cacioppo, J. T. (1986). The elaboration likelihood model of 
persuasion. In L. Berkowitz (Ed.), Advances in experimental social psy- 
chology, (Vol. 19, pp. 123-205). New York: Academic. 
Raghubir, P., & Menon, G. (1998). AIDS and me, never the twain shall meet: 
The effects of information accessibility on judgments of risk and advertis- 
ing effectiveness. Journal of Consumer Research, 25, 52-63. 
Reber, R., & Schwarz, N. (1999). Effects of perceptual fluency on judg- 
ments of truth. Consciousness and Cognition, 8, 338-342. 
Reber, R., Schwarz, N., & Winkielman, P. (2003). ProcessingPuency and 
aesthetic pleasure: Is beauty in the perceiver's processing experience? 
Manuscript submitted for publication. 
Reber, R., Winkielman P., & Schwarz N. (1998). Effects of perceptual flu- 
ency on affective judgments. Psychological Science, 9, 4 5 4 8 .  
Rothman, A. J., & Schwarz, N. (1998). Constructing perceptions of vul- 
nerability: Personal relevance and the use of experiential information in 
health judgments. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 24, 
1053-1064. 
Ruder, M., &Bless, H. (2003). Mood and the reliance on the ease of retrieval 
heuristic. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 85, 20-32. 
Sanna, L. J., & Schwarz, N. (2003). Debiasing hindsight: The role of acces- 
sibility experiences and attributions. Journal of Experimental Social Psy- 
chology, 39, 287-295. 
Sanna, L., & Schwarz, N. (2004). Integrating temporal biases: The interplay 
of focal thoughts and accessihility experiences. Psychological Science, 
17,47448 1. 
Sanna, L., Schwarz, N., & Small, E. (2002). Accessibility experiences and 
the hindsight bias: I-knew-it-all-along versus it-could-never-have-hap- 
pened. Memory & Cognition, 30, 1288-1296. 
Sanna, L. J., Schwarz, N., & Stocker, S. L. (2002). When debiasing hack- 
fires: Accessible content and accessihility experiences in dehiasing hind- 
sight. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, Cogni- 
tion, 28. 497-502. 
Schwarz, N. (1987). Stimmung als Information [Mood as information]. Hei- 
delherg, Germany: Springer-Verlag. 
Schwarz, N. (1998). Accessible content and accessibility experiences: The 
interplay of declarative and experiential information in judgment. Person- 
ality and Social Psychology Review, 2, 87-99. 
Schwarz, N. (2002). Situated cognition and the wisdom of feelings: Cogni- 
tive tuning. In L. Feldman Barrett & P. Salovey (Eds.), The wisdom in feel- 
ings (pp. 144-166). New York: Guilford. 
Schwarz, N. (2003, October). The malleable meaning of experience. In R. 
Petty (Chair), Controversies in ease of recall research. Symposium con- 
ducted at the meeting of the Society for Experimental Social Psychology, 
Boston. 
Schwarz, N., Bless, H., & Bohner, G. (1991). Mood and persuasion: 
Affective states influence the processing of persuasive communications. 
Advances in Experimental Social Psychology, 24, 16 1-199. 
Schwarz, N., Bless, H., Strack, F., Klumpp, G., Rittenauer-Schatka, H., & 
Simons, A. (1991). Ease of retrieval as information: Another look at the 
availability heuristic. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 61, 
195-202. 
Schwarz, N., & Clore, G. L. (1983). Mood, misattrihution, and judgments of 
well-being: Informative and directive functions of affective states. Jour- 
nal of Personality and Social Psychology, 45, 5 13-523. 
Schwarz, N., & Clore, G. L. (1996). Feelings and phenomenal experiences. 
In E. T. Higgins & A. W. Kruglanski (Eds.), Social psychology: Hund- 
book of basic principles (pp. 433465). New York: Guilford. 
Schwarz, N., & Schuman, H. (1997). Political knowledge, attribution, and 
inferred political interest: The operation of buffer items. International 
Journal of Public Opinion Research, 9, 191-195. 
Schwarz, N., Servay, W., & Kumpf, M. (1985). Attribution of arousal as a 
mediator of the effectiveness of fear-arousing communications. Journal 
ofApplied Social Psychology, 15, 74-84. 
Schwarz, N., & Skurnik, I. (2003). Feeling and thinking: Implications for 
problem solving. In J. Davidson & R. Sternberg (Eds.), The nature of 
problem solving (pp. 263-292). Cambridge, England: Cambridge Univer- 
sity Press. 
Schwarz, N., & Vaughn, L. A. (2002). The availability heuristic revisited: 
Recalled content and ease of recall as information. In T. Gilovich, D. Grif- 
fin, & D. Kahneman (Eds.), The psychology of intuitive judgment: 
Heuristics and biases (pp. 103-1 19). Cambridge, England: Cambridge 
University Press. 
Seamon, J. G., Brody, N., & Kauff, D. M. (1983). Affective discrimination 
of stimuli that are not recognized: Effects of shadowing, masking, and 
central laterality. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Mem- 
ory and Cognition, 9, 544-555. 
Simonson, I. (1989). Choice based on reasons: The case of attraction and 
compromise effects. Journal of Consumer Research, 16, 158-174. 
Sinclair, R. C., Soldat, A. S., & Mark, M. M. (1998). Affective cues and pro- 
cessing strategy: Color coded forms influence performance. Teaching of 
Psychology, 25, 130-132. 
Skurnik, I., Schwarz, N., & Winkielman, P. (2000). Drawing inferences from 
feelings: The role of naive beliefs. In H. Bless & J. Forgas (Eds.), The 
message within: The role of subjective experience in social cognition and 
behavior (pp. 162-175). Philadelphia: Psychology Press. 
Skurnik, I., Yoon, C., Park, D. C., & Schwarz, N. (in press). How warnings 
about false claims become recommendations. Journal of Consumer Re- 
search. 
Soldat, A. S., Sinclair, R. C., & Mark, M. M. (1997). Color as an environ- 
mental processing cue: External affective cues can directly affect process- 
ing strategy without affecting mood. Social Cognition, 15, 55-71. 
Stepper, S., & Strack F. (1993). Proprioceptive determinants of emotional 
and nonemotional feelings. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 
64, 21 1-220. 
Strack, F., & Hannover, B. (1996). Awareness of influence as a precondi- 
tion for implementing correctional goals. In P. M. Gollwitzer & J. A. 
Bargh (Eds.), The psychology of action (pp. 579-595). New York: 
Guilford. 
Strack, F., & Neumann, R. (2000). Furrowing the brow may undermine per- 
ceived fame: The role of facial feedback in judgments of celebrity. Per- 
sonality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 26. 762-768. 
Tatarkiewicz, W. (1 970). History of aesthetics. The Hague, Netherlands: 
Mouton. 
Tormala, Z. L., Petty, R. E., & BriAol, P. (2002). Ease of retrieval effects in 
persuasion: A self-validation analysis. Personality and Social Psychology 
Bulletin, 28, 170CL1712. 
Tversky, A., & Kahneman, D. (1973). Availability: A heuristic for judging 
frequency and probability. Cognitive Psychology, 5, 207-232. 
Tybout, A. M., Sternthal, B., Malaviya, P., Bakamitsos, G. A., & Park, S. B. 
(in press). When are judgments based on product benefits versus retrieval 
ease? Journal of Consumer Research. 
Uleman, J .  S. (1999). Spontaneous versus intentional inferences in impres- 
sion formation. In S. Chaiken & Y. Trope (Eds.), Dual process theories in 
social psychology (pp. 161-178). New York: Guilford. 
Wanke, M., & Bless, H. (2000). The effects of subjective ease of retrieval on 
attitudinal judgments: The moderating role of processing motivation. In 
H. Bless & J. P. Forgas (Eds.), The message within: The role of subjective 
experience in social cognition and behavior (pp. 143-161). Philadelphia: 
Psychology Press. 
Wanke, M., Bless, H., &Biller, B. (1996). Subjective experience versus con- 
tent of information in the construction of attitude judgments. Personality 
and Social Psychology Bulletin, 22, 1105-1 1 13. 
Wanke, M., Bohner, G., & Jurkowitsch, A. (1997). There are many rea- 
sons to drive a BMW-Surely you know one: Ease of argument genera- 
tion influences brand attitudes. Journal of Consumer Research, 24, 
70-77. 
Wanke, M., Schwarz, N., & Bless, H. (1995). The availability heuristic re- 
visited: Experienced ease of retrieval in mundane frequency estimates. 
Acta Psychologica, 89, 83-90. 
348 SCHWARZ 
Werth, L., & Strack, F. (2003). An inferential approach to the 
knew-it-all-along effect. Memory, 11, 41 1 4 1 9 .  
Whittlesea, B. W. A. (1993). Illusions of familiarity. Journal of Experimen- 
tal Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition, 19, 1235-1253. 
Whittlesea, B. W. A,, Jacoby, L. L., & Girard, K. (1990). Illusions of imme- 
diate memory: Evidence of an attributional basis for feelings of familiar- 
ity and perceptual quality. Journal of Memory and Language, 29, 
716-732. 
Whittlesea, B. W. A,, & Williams, L. D. (1998). Why do strangers feel famil- 
iar but friends don't? A discrepancy-attribution account of feelings of fa- 
miliarity. Acta Psychologica, 98, 141-165. 
Whittlesea, B. W. A., & Williams, L. D. (2000). The source of feelings of fa- 
miliarity: The discrepancy-attribution hypothesis. Journal of Experimen- 
tal Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition, 26, 547-565. 
Wilson, T. D., & Brekke, N. (1994). Mental contamination and mental cor- 
rection: Unwanted influences on judgments and evaluations. Psychologi- 
cal Bulletin, 116, 1 17-142. 
Winkielman, P., & Cacioppo, J. T. (2001). Mind at ease puts a smile on the 
face: Psychophysiological evidence that processing facilitation leads to 
positive affect. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 81, 
989-1000. 
Winkielman, P., & Fazendeiro, T. A. (2003). The role of conceptualJuenc)~ 
in preference and memory. Unpublished manuscript. 
Winkielman, P., & Schwarz, N. (2001). How pleasant was your childhood? 
Beliefs about memory shape inferences from experienced difficulty of re- 
call. Psychological Science, 12, 176-179. 
Winkielman, P., Schwarz, N., & Belli, R. F. (1998). The role of ease of re- 
trieval and attribution in memory judgments: Judging your memory as 
worse despite recalling more events. Psychological Science, 9, 124-126. 
Winkielman, P., Schwarz, N., Fazendeiro, T, & Reber, R. (2003). The 
hedonic marking of processing fluency: Implications for evaluative judg- 
ment. In J. Musch & K. C. Klauer (Eds.), The psychology of evaluation: 
Affectiveprocesses in cognition and emotion (pp. 189-217). Mahwah, NJ: 
Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Inc. 
Winkielman, P., Schwarz, N., & Nowak, A. (2002). Affect and processing 
dynamics. In S. Moore & M. Oaksford (Eds.), Emotional cognition (pp. 
11 1-138). Amsterdam: John Benjamins. 
Winkielman. P., Schwarz, N., Reber, R., Fazendeiro, T. (2003). Cognitive 
and affective consequences of visual fluency: When seeing is easy on the 
mind. In L. Scott & R. Batra (Eds.), Persuasive imagery: A consumer re- 
sponseperspective (pp. 75-89). Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associ- 
ates, Inc. 
Witherspoon, D., & Allan, L. G. (1985). The effects of a prior presentation 
on temporal judgments in a perceptual identification task. Memory and 
Cognition, 13, 103-1 1 1. 
Wyer, R. S., & Srull, T. K. (1989). Memory and cognition in its social con- 
text. Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Inc. 
Xu, J., & Schwarz, N. (2004). Was it long ago or unimportant? Diverging in- 
ferences from dificulty of recall. Unpublished manucaript, University of 
Michigan. 
Zajonc, R. B. (1968). Attitudinal effects of mere exposure. Journal of Per- 
sonality and Social Psychology: Monograph Supplement, 9, 1-27. 
Zajonc, R. B. (2000). Feeling and thinking: Closing the debate over the inde- 
pendence of affect. In J. P. Forgas (Ed.), Feeling and thinking: The role of 
affect in social cognition (pp. 31-58). New York: Cambridge University 
Press. 
Received: December 8,2003 
